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I 
In the preface to A Contribution to the Critique of 
Political Economy we have Marx's famous phrase "it is 
not the consciousness of men that determines their 
being, but, on the contrary, their social being which 
determines their consciousness."[1] Again in the 
German Ideology we find Marx saying that "life is not 
determined by consciousness, but consciousness by 
life"[2] and that "consciousness is, therefore, from 
the very beginning a social product, and remains so as 
long as men exist at all. . . . moreover, it is quite 
immaterial what consciousness starts to do on its 
own."(3] Finally, in the Communist Manifesto Marx asks 
rhetorically "does it require deep intuition to com-
prehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in a 
word, man's consciousness, changes with every change in 
the conditions of his material existence, in his social 
relations and in his social life?"(4] 
These well-worn phrases of Marx have been cited by 
many a writer who in attempting to explicate Marx's 
materialist conception of history have concluded that 
with Marx consciousness has exactly the opposite role 
that it had for Hegel. Whereas Hegel treated nature as 
a shadowy product of mind (Geist) Marx treats con-
sciousness as a more or less epiphenomenal manis-
festation of material forces--a manifestation which at 
best can have the quality of being a mirror-image of 
reality, but which oftentimes functions as an illusion 
when it, attributes to itself causal powers which are 
really attributable to material forces. Marx himself 
seems to give credence to this interpretation when in 
the 1872 afterword to Capital he states that: 
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my dialectic is not only different from the 
Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, 
the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the 
process of thinking, which, under the name of 
'the Idea', he even transforms into an indepen-
dent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, 
and the real world is only the external, 
phenomenal form of 'the Idea'. With me, on the 
other hand, the ideal is nothing else than the 
material world reflected by the human mind, and 
translated into forms of thought.|5] 
Thus, Hegel's dialectic "is standing on its head. It 
must be turned right side up again, if you v/ould 
discover the rational kernel within the mystical 
shell."161 
These statements pose problems for the reader of 
Marx who feels obliged to conclude from a study of the 
whole of Marx's writings that in his materialistic 
conception of history consciousness must have a role 
which goes beyong that of being a mere passive reflec-
tion of reality. After all, isn't the revolutionary 
consciousness of the proletariat more than just a con-
sequence of its material conditions but in addition a 
social force which is required in order for the tran-
sition to be made from capitalism to socialism? 
Doesn't Marx's theory itself make a difference to the 
reality which it examines and analyses when it is ap-
plied to that reality for revolutionary purposes? 
We can begin to get some perspective on these is-
sues when v/e realize that many writers who interpret 
Marx's inversion of Hegel as leading to a trivializa-
tion of the role of consciousness in history have 
before hand confused Hegel's position, and in following 
out the implications of this inversion thereby confuse 
Marx's position. Thus, for example, although Marx was 
impressed with Feuerbach's 'transformative method' and 
applied it in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right it is clear that Marx did not accept the 
epistemological consequences which Feuerbach drew in 
transforming Hegel's idealism into materialism. In-
deed, Marx was highly influenced by Hegel's Phenome-
nology of Mind, with its view that man's relation to 
reality is not fundamentally a passive relation but an 
active one in which the subject is involved in con-
stituting the relation. Although it is a moot question 
as to whether Feuerbach actually did misinterpret 
Hegel--and in any case he was influenced by the 
tradition of mechanistic materialism which treated 
reality as a passive object of perception--it is 
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certain that when Marx applies the transformative 
method to Hegel the results differ from Feuerbach1s. 
It is to an examination of Marx's first three Theses on 
Feuerbach that we will now turn in order to grasp these 
results clearly. Later we will apply these results to 
an understanding of the nature of production in gener-
al, and also address ourselves to the question of de-
terminism in history. Finally, we will discuss some 
general criticisms of Marx's theory and evaluate its 
consistency in attempting to account for revolutionary 
practice. 
II 
In his first thesis on Feuerbach Marx criticizes 
Feuerbach's materialism for conceiving of reality "only 
in the form of the object or of contemplation, but not 
as human sensuous activity, practice, not subjective-
ly. T rf7l _ Whereas idealism does develop the 'active 
side' of reality, although in a one-sided abstract form 
since it disregards the 'sensuousness' of this 
activity, materialism takes a 'theoretical attitude' 
towards sensuous objects, and hence cannot "grasp the 
significance of 'revolutionary', of practical-critical 
activity."(8] 
How does idealism develop the active side of 
reality? As Marx points out in the Paris Manuscripts 
"the outstanding thing in Hegel's Phenomenology. . . . 
is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-genesis of 
man as a process, conceives objectification as a loss 
of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of 
this alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of 
labour and comprehends objective man—true, because 
real man—as the outcome of man's own labour."[91 
However, this 'active side' is comprehended only for-
mally and abstractly because it occurs as a process 
within self-consciousness where labour is only 
'abstractly mental labour', and where "the alienation 
of self-consciousness establishes thinghood."(10] 
Why does Feuerbach's materialism take a 'theoreti-
cal attitude' which fails to grasp the significance of 
'practical-critical activity'? In the German Ideology 
Marx tells us that although Feuerbach, unlike the 'pure 
materialists', understands that man as well as nature 
is a sensuous object, yet he conceives of man merely as 
'object of the senses' and not as 'sensuous activity'. 
"Thus he never manages to conceive the sensuous world 
as total living sensuous activity of the individuals 
composing it."(11] For Marx this sensuous activity is 
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human labor, the production of material life, in which 
man distinguishes himself from animals by . performing 
the 'first historical act', an act which is the 
"fundamental condition of all history.11112) Moreover, 
this activity is revolutionary in that it is involved 
in creating and changing reality, especially that 
reality which man experiences as alienation. Although 
at first consciousness is merely 'consciousness con-
cerning the immediate sensuous environment', under con-
ditions of alienation it can become a critical con-
sciousness where in confronting reality v/ith the idea 
of human liberation man acts on the basis of this idea 
to transform reality. Feuerbach, however, treats 'Man* 
as object of contemplation rather than as 1 real 
historical man'. Therefore, "as far as Feuerbach is a 
materialist he does 'not deal with history, and as far 
as he considers history he is not a materialist. With 
him history and materialism diverge completely."(13) 
Where, then,, does Marx stand with respect to 
traditional idealism and classical materialism? As one 
writer has expressed it Marx "urged a synthesis that 
would integrate the sensuousness projected by materi-
alism and activity as projected by. ideali sin. " J14) In 
the Paris Manuscripts Marx referred to his position in 
distinction from both idealism and materialism as a 
"consistent naturalism or humanism"[15) and in the 
German Ideology he refers to the communist as a 
"practical materialist."(16) However we label it, 
Marx's conception of sensuous practice, upon which he 
bases his historical perspective on man, implies that 
there is a dynamic relation between consciousness and 
reality, a relation which is obscured when phrases of 
Marx, like those cited at the beginning of this paper, 
are taken out of the context of his overall thought. 
Marx's second thesis on Feuerbach brings us to the 
question of the relation of theory and practice. Here 
Marx says that "the question whether objective truth 
can be attributed to human thinking is not a question 
of theory but a practical question. Man must prove the 
truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-
sidedness of his thinking in practice."[17) Does this 
mean that man literally creates truth out of his 
actions, or that the criterion of truth is some sort of 
pragmatic notion of success? Since Hegel viewed 
reality as the creation of reason, it might seem as if 
Marx, in bringing Hegel's notion of activity down to 
earth, is holding that practice creates reality. Actu-
ally, this is to some degree a correct interpretation, 
although it must be understood in an epistemological 
rather than an ontological context. In other words, 
242 
Marx does not believe that material reality is 
literally the creation of practice, but that this 
reality as involving a dynamic relation to man is only 
known by him concretely through practice. What Marx 
exphasizes here is that theory alone cannot grasp 
truth, which is the dynamic relation of man and world, 
but that only theory unified with practice can do this. 
Man's concrete being is the whole of this dynamic 
relation along with its terms, and hence when Marx says 
that being determines consciousness he must mean, as N. 
Rotenstreich has put it, "that consciousness is not cut 
off from existence and is not bound to an independent 
realm. Consciousness is only a part of existence, de-
termined by its totality."(18] This perspective helps 
us to make sense not only of phrases in Marx such as 
'being determines consciousness', but also of Marx's 
polemics against Hegel when he says that the Ideal is a 
reflection of the material world, for what Marx is at-
tacking is a view which abstracts consciousness from 
the world and treats it as independent from sensuous 
practice. Marx's dynamic, organic conception of prac-
tice will be important when we examine the nature of 
production generally later on. 
Before proceeding further, we should note that 
Marx's conception of practice does not imply that he is 
a 'pragmatist', despite the fact that there is a simi-
larity betv/een the pragmatic and the Marxist conception 
of truth. As Rotenstreich puts it, in Marx 
practice has as its objective the total change of 
reality. Pragmatism is concerned explicitly with 
some particular changes in our experience or with 
some particular consequences, because pragmatism 
does not begin with the total conception of 
reality that must be practically materialized, 
but with a fragmentary and piecemeal hypothesis 
that has to be applied to a particular 
experience.(19] 
Put another way, whereas Marx conceives of practice as 
'realization', pragmatism "conceives of practice as the 
decision as to What to do and what means to employ in 
the doing."120] Thus, Marxists would criticize Dewey's 
faith in 'creative intelligence' because it is not able 
to get to the real root of human alienation in society, 
not capable of understanding the materialist foundation 
of social change.(21J This inability of pragmatism to 
grasp the 'total conception of reality' seems to be 
rooted in its ontological assumptions. As J. Habermas 
points out, Pierce's logic of inquiry does not deal 
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adequately with the difference between that part of 
reality which is independent of human learning and 
control, and that part which we grasp hold of when it 
becomes the correlate of true statements about reality. 
In effect, Pierce "limits himself to a concept of 
reality that is exhausted in being the correlate of all 
possible true statements."1221 Marx, on the other 
hand, can be characterized as a realist in the sense 
that nature is the independent correlate of conscious-
ness. In the transforming of natural objects into pro-
duced objects the latter do not lose their character of 
being-in-themselves but are nevertheless transformed 
into a constituted objectivity through human activity. 
This accomplishment is rooted in the labor process 
where nature is made objective for us by way of 
mediation v/ith human subjectivity. Hence, "the cate-
gory of man as a tool-making animal signifies a schema 
both of action and of apprehending the world . . . thus 
in materialism labor has the function of 
synthesis."123) 
J. Habermas has pointed out that in contrast to 
Kant, Eichte and Hegel, this notion of synthesis does 
not produce a logical structure which can be thought of 
either as detached a priori from empirical reality or 
as developing out of the movement of pure self-
consciousness; rather, it takes place in the medium of 
labor and results in a structured reality which mani-
fests itself in the system of social labor. Thus, "the 
point of departure for a reconstruction of synthetic 
accomplishment is not logic but the economy."[24] This 
synthesis, however, can never be an absolute one as in 
Hegel's philosophy of identity in difference between 
mind and nature, since the unity of objective and sub-
jective through practice is, to a degree, imposed on a 
Nature which remains - external and independent with 
respect to the subject. The experience of this exter-
nality and independence of nature is manifest in man's 
subjection to natural laws which constrain his 
activity. But since human reality which is fundamen-
tally an historical reality (i.e.,the development of 
men's productive abilities through time) is only con-
crete in its synthesis, any talk about nature 'in-
itself is just as abstract as talk about pure self-
consciousness . 125 ] 
In the third thesis on Feuerbach Marx holds that 
previous materialism, which emphasizes that men are 
products of their circumstances, "forget that it is men 
who change circumstances and that it is essential to 
educate the educator himself."(26) In other words, 
there is a reciprocal relation between man and his cir-
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cumstances such that not only are men's circumstances 
historically conditions on the human being who con-
stitutes his environment through sensuous activity, but 
these conditions are reconstructed through practice as 
well. Viewed concretely as man's historical condi-
tions, and not abstractly as nature 'in-itself', man's 
circumstances cannot be radically separated from his 
activity; rather, both must be seen as aspects of man's 
social reality taken as a whole. As Rotenstreich has 
suggested, activity and circumstances "cannot be 
separated even to fix the temporal antecedence of the 
one over the other. Production, which is--as Marx 
said—the first historical act, contains the charac-
teristic tension of practice, that is, the circum-
stances and the change. Here we have no first 
foothold."{27 J 
Finally, revolutionary practice and criticism go 
hand in hand for Marx. The critical reform of con-
sciousness through analysis of its mystical forms ena-
bles men to explain to themselves the meaning of their 
actions. Revolutionary activity which is not properly 
informed ceases to be effectively revolutionary, as 
Marx indicates in his critique of the Gotha Program. 
Marx's abandoning of philosophy in turning to histori-
cal materialism is the abandoning of a mode of theori-
zing which remains abstract, but it does not involve 
abandoning theory altogether since practice must be 
guided critically by theory. However, for theory to 
become a 'material force' it must turn 'relentless 
criticism' away from religion and philosophy to polit-
ical economy. "It is clear that the arm of criticism 
cannot replace the criticism of arms. Material force 
can only be overthrown by material force; but theory 
itself becomes a material force when it has seized the 
masses."(28J As to whether Marx developed the concept 
of criticism sufficiently such that it could serve, not 
only as a guide to men's productive activity in the 
strict sense, but as a guide to the activity of class 
struggle, especially as this takes place on the 
ideological level, with call for further comment after 
we have examined Marx's understanding of the general 
nature of production and addressed ourselves to the 
question of determinism in history. 
Ill 
Now that we have examined the philosophical ground-
work for Marx's understanding of the relationship of 
consciousness to reality in sensuous human practice we 
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can turn to an examination of Marx's view of the nature 
of production in general. What we want to show here is 
that when Marx actually engages in a critique of 
political economy his method is consistent with his 
view of the dialectical interaction of man and v/orld as 
he stated it philosophically. I will go into some 
detail in explicating his view of production in general 
since it provides a good example of Marx's dialectical 
approach to political economy. 
In the introduction to the Grundrisse Marx states 
that the phrase 'production in general' is a 'rational 
abstraction' insofar as it singles out and fixes the 
common features of all stages of production historical-
ly. This abstraction is useful in that it saves us 
from repetition of these common features when examining 
each stage, but it is no substitute for empirical ex 
amination since these general features 'constitute 
something very complex' and are found in conditions 
which have "essential points of difference."1291 Marx 
criticizes those modern economists who in failing to 
remember this "are trying to prove the eternal nature 
and* harmony of existing social conditions."[30] Also, 
in postulating production as subject to eternal laws 
independent of historical development, as opposed to 
distribution which is viewed as an arbitrary, cont-
ingent process, these economists artificially divorce 
production from distribution and tend to see "only an 
accidental reflective connection in what constitutes an 
organic union."(31] 
In his explanation of the general nature of produc-
tion Marx examines , the relation between production, 
distribution, exchange and consumption. He begins by 
telling us that a mere linear characterization is inad-
equate: for example, production as the starting point, 
consumption as the end point and distribution and ex-
change as the middle. Rather, these elements must be 
related together as comprising an organic whole. Pro-
duction is dependent on and internally related to con-
sumption in that the latter provides the individual 
human being for whom there are products, for whom the 
product in consumption is a 'real' product. 
"Consumption gives the product the finishing touch by 
annihilating it, since the result of production is a 
product, not as the material embodiment of activity, 
but only as an object for the active subject."(32] 
.Also, consumption creates the necessity for new produc-
tion by providing its impulse and guiding aim, "it fur-
nishes the objects of production in a form that is 
still subjective. No needs, no production. But con-
sumption reproduces the need."(33] 
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On the other hand, consumption is dependent on 
production in that the latter furnishes the former with 
its material as a potential product, as well as giving 
consumption its character (e.g., eating with utensils 
as opposed to with hands) and creating in the consumer 
a want for its object through its availability. Thus, 
production and consumption are related such that "each 
appears as the means of the other and as being brought 
about by the other, which is expressed as their mutual 
interdependence."[34] Marx goes on to exhibit the in-
terdependence of the other elements as well by showing 
that just as the form of distribution is determined by 
the manner of participation in production, distribution 
determines the organization of production through the 
distributing of the means of production as well as the 
distribution of manpower through the division of labor. 
Finally, while production determines circulation and 
exhange, the latter is also included in and determines 
the former in that "the exchange of activities and 
abilities which takes place in production" is essential 
to the character that it has.(35) 
Despite this 'mutual interdependence' of elements 
Marx also seems to indicate that there is a fundamental 
asymmetry in these relations. He says 
Consumption, as a natural necessity, as a want, 
constitutes an internal factor of productive 
activity, but the latter is the starting point of 
realization and, therefore, its predominating 
factor, the act in which the entire process 
recapitulates itself.(36] 
How are we to understand this qualification? Are v/e to 
conclude that Marx's thought here is somewhat confused, 
that what he acknowledges on the one hand he denies on 
the other? 
In recapitulating his view of how these elements 
are related together Marx says that they are not to be 
seen as all strictly identical, even though internally 
related., but as different aspects of the same totality 
(to use a Hegelian phrase, an identity-in-the-differ-
ences). Again, he says that production predominates 
but it becomes clear that he does not mean production 
in the narrow sense, production conceived in abstrac-
tion from the other elements, but production as in-
cluding these elements within it. Thus Marx states 
that "a definite form of production thus determines the 
form of consumption, distribution, exchange and also 
the mutual relations between these various elements. 
Of course, production in its one sided form is in its 
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turn influenced by other elements. M( 37] V/e see, then, 
that the sense in which production predominates with 
respect to the various elements is the sense in which 
the whole of an activity predominates its parts; the 
mutual interaction which takes place between the 
various elements does so within the context of their 
organic relation to the whole. Marx, therefore, does 
not conceive of production in its one sided or narrow 
sense as ultimately having primacy in determining the 
other elements considered as external to it, since this 
notion of production is simply an element along with 
the others in production as a whole and can only be 
separated from production as a whole through abstrac-
tion. | 38) 
This discussion of production by Marx has sig-
nificant implications for the issue of determinism in 
history, an issue v/hich has direct bearing on the 
question of the role of consciousness in history, i.e., 
whether consciousness is little more than the causal 
result of impersonal material forces. Deterministic 
renderings of historical materialism consistently fail 
to appreciate v/hat Marx inherits from Hegel when the 
former applies dialectics to the critique of political 
economy. William H. Shaw, for example, advances an in-
terpretation which he calls 'technological determinism' 
in which the productive forces are 'in the long-run de-
terminant of social change1. What he means by this is 
that "changes in the realtions of production are always 
a result of changes in the productive forces."[39] He 
recognizes that the productive forces cannot be viewed 
as a sufficient condition for changes in the relations 
of production since Marx's theory requires that 
discrepencies between the two be allowed to occur, that 
they become at certain levels of development 
contradictory. Shaw concludes from his examination of 
Marx and Engels' works that they attached some sort of 
'ontological primacy' to material production and that 
"the introduction of new relations of production is 
contingent on the development of the productive forces 
in a way in v/hich those forces are not dependent on the 
relations."[40] Since society will not give up its ac-
quired productive forces, the relations of production 
must be in the subordinate position of accomodation. 
The development of the productive forces is thus a 
'natural' one and provides a "solid foundation for the 
investigation of human society."[41] Although Shaw 
recognizes the validity of viewing the system of 
production as an organic unity, he holds, nevertheless, 
that one element of this unity does have causal 
primacy, namely the forces of production. Shaw also 
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recognizes that the concept of the productive forces is 
an abstraction from the social world, yet he holds that 
only by viewing them as the underlying rhythm of 
historical progress for Marx can there be an under-
standing of the development of the relations of produc-
tion, and hence social development generally. 
Aside from the fact that Shaw's notion of produc-
tive force determinism provides a rather weak sense of 
determination (a more interesting notion would hold the 
productive forces to provide sufficient conditions, or 
both necessary and sufficient conditions, for changes 
in the relations of production),[42] is clear from 
Marx's discussion on production that although produc-
tion taken in the narrow sense (and the notion of 
productive forces is a further refinement or narrowing 
of this sense of production) may constitute a necessary 
condition for the existence of other elements in a way 
in which they do not do so with respect to production, 
Marx's view of production in the broader sense exhibits 
an interdependency of elements such that each, in its 
own particular way, is a necessary condition for the 
other. We can abstract these elements apart from one 
another and notice the various sorts of interactions 
they exhibit and observe various sorts of dependencies, 
but it is clear for Marx that when we do this we are no 
longer dealing with production as a unity, and thus not 
looking at it concretely. To give one part of the 
whole some sort of ultimate primacy over the rest, as 
Shaw attempts to do, by way of certain analytical 
distinctions is to reintroduce the sort of mechanistic 
explanation Marx criticized, and even despite Shaw's 
recognition that "for Marx the productive forces are 
human forces, by and large man's creations, employed in 
his material reproduction of society."(43] But then 
why even call this by the name 'technological determi-
nism'? If the productive forces are human forces then 
a concept of human self-determination would seem to be 
more appropriate, as well as consistent v/ith the or-
ganic model of activity which Marx inherits from 
Hegel.(44] 
IV 
The question of the role of consciousness in 
history also applies to the issue of the relationship 
between the material base and superstructure in Marx's 
writings, where now we are not talking about material 
production only but society as a whole. There are 
three ways in which we can view the relation of base 
and superstructure. It can be understood statically as 
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the difference between those forms of social or-
ganization which spring directly out of the mode of 
production, and those others, religious, legal, politi-
cal, philosophical, etc., which do not. Secondly, the 
dynamic relation betv/een base and superstructure can be 
stated in terms of either a correspondence or con-
tradiction between the two, where the superstructure 
either furthers or hinders the development taking place 
in the base. Finally, there is a practical connection 
between base and superstructure by way of social 
classes in which the contradiction between base and 
superstructure is carried out in the form of class 
struggle.[45| 
Now the relation between base and superstructure is 
often thought of in terms of primary and derivative 
structures respectively, but it is important to see 
that if Marx's philosophical model of human reality is 
to be applied consistently, then, analogously to 
production, the formation of the superstructure cannot 
be understood as a mere reflex of the base. It is true 
that when the superstructure manifests ideological 
distortions of social reality it will appear as a 
shadowy projection of that reality, and hence exhibit 
the character of a dependent and conditioned lesser 
reality. But this does not rule out the possibility 
that various forms of consciousness manifest in the 
superstructure may not only grasp social reality at its 
core, but also provide the theoretical-practical im-
petus for revolutionary transformation of reality. 
Here the social forces of change do not mechanically 
spring up out of the economic base, but are nurtured in 
the interaction of the base with the superstructure. 
Is this line of thought consistent with the pro-
nouncements of Marx and Engels on historical 
materialism? According to Martin Seliger, Marx's theo-
ry of history bears the *sin of overstatement' in that 
'this theory contains the extreme position that all 
ideology is 'false consciousness' (a term coined by 
Engels, not Marx), that it is a distortion of reality 
which is a necessary consequence of the dependence of 
thought upon socio-economic conditions.(46] In support 
of his thesis Seliger points to passages in Marx such 
as those quoted at the beginning of this paper, and he 
takes particular note of one passage in which an 
analogy is made between ideology and a camera obsura in 
which real world relationships are inverted.(47] 
Although Seliger acknowledges that Marx and Engels made 
statements, both in the German Ideology and elsewhere, 
that deviate from their 'dogmatic' thesis, he concludes 
that "this indicates their failure to think through the 
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matter systematically,"{48J and that in allowing ap-
parent exceptions to this thesis "Marx simply made 
statements offending against hl3 general rules without 
ever showing any awareness that he was doing so."{49] 
Moreover, Seliger accuses Marx and Engels of a grander 
inconsistency in failing to reconcile their 'dogmatic 
conception of ideology' with their "express belief in 
the objectivity of their 'positive science.'"[50J In 
other words, Marx's identifying of certain ideologies 
as 'false consciousness' (e.g., the bourgeois ideology) 
presupposed a knowledge of the criteria of correct 
thinking, of an objective theory of social thought 
which is impossible if all social thought is distorted 
as a result of being dependent on socio-economic 
conditions. 
John Plamenatz in commenting on Marx's treatment of 
consciousness in relation to the material conditions of 
social life notes that "this part of Marx's theory is 
so obsure and confused that there is no extracting from 
it a coherent account of how men's ways of thinking are 
related to other aspects of their life in society51J 
In criticizing what he takes to be Marx's position as 
presented in the German Ideology he further argues that 
"if consciousness, understood as the use of ideas, as 
conceptual thinking, is derivative in relation to 
material intercourse, it is so only in the sense that 
the earliest forms of material intercourse preceeded 
it. It is not so in the sense that material inter-
course, once consciousness has arisen, continues to af-
fect it without being affected by it."{52) While 
noting that Marx 'often enough' implicitly admits this 
in various places (as in a passage from the Grundrisse 
where Marx distinguishes between hunger satisfied with 
utensils and hunger satisfied with the bare hands), 
Plamenatz concludes that Marx's "conception of man as a 
self-creative being is therefore incompatible with the 
account that Marx and Engels give in the German 
Ideology of how material intercourse is related to 
consciousness."(53] 
Now there is no denying that there are ter-
minological conflicts and inconsistencies in the works 
of Marx and Engels, and many of these can probably be 
explained as the result of carelessness and of issues 
which were incompletely thought out by the two 
thinkers, not to mention intentional overemphasis for 
the purpose of stressing what they had felt were unduly 
neglected points about the role of material conditions 
in social life. But to accuse Marx and Engels of a 
fundamental conceptual inconsistency is a much more 
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serious charge, and a few responses to that charge as 
expressed in the above views are in order. 
First, the passages which Seliger selects from the 
German Ideology, the Holy Family, the Communi st 
Manifesto, Capital and the Grundrisse are not nearly so 
clear and cannot with certitude be put into a unified 
context such that one could extract as a definitive 
standpoint a 'dogmatic*•position by Marx and Engels on 
the role of consciousness in history. Indeed, one can 
gather many passages from these same works and arrive 
at a quite different conclusion, namely that ideas do 
have an efficacy historically and that the truths which 
ideas can convey are precisely v/hat make the productive 
forces of history human forces. This conclusion, 
rather than Seliger's, is consistent with Marx's dia-
lectical conception of human praxis as expressed in the 
Paris Manuscripts and the Theses on Feuerbach which v/e 
examined earlier. I would suggest that Seliger's anal-
ysis of the role of conceptual thought in Marx is not 
only insensitive to the concept of man that Marx 
elaborates on in his early writings, but also that 
Seliger's own understanding of dialectics is rather 
weak as is evidenced in the ease with which he reaches 
the conclusion that dialectical thinkers of the calibre 
of Marx and Engels were so blind and dogmatic as to 
fall into an obvious self-referential inconsistency. 
Second, even if we were to grant Seliger that all 
ideology, as Marx and Engels sometimes used the word, 
is distortion of reality, this need not imply that all 
consciousness is 'false consciousness'. As Plamenatz 
himself points out, "though Marx occasionally uses the 
words 'consciousness' and 'ideology' in the same sense, 
he does not do so always. Consciousness is the wider 
term, for it covers all forms of conceptual thinking, 
whereas ideology is used nearly always in a narrower 
sense. Ideology is sometimes called 'false conscious-
ness', which implies that it is only a part of con-
sciousness ."[54J In other words, the very concept of 
'false consciousness' implies, at least for dialectical 
thinking, that there is a 'true consciousness', and it 
seems clear that Marx needed to rely on some such 
conception in order to justify how the proletariat 
could be able to come to an understanding of its his-
torical role, an understanding which was in Marx's eyes 
requisite in order for revolutionary change to come 
about from capitalism. 
The implied relation between true and false con-
sciousness in Marx seems' to be the following. False 
consciousness involves conceptual thinking which offers 
general explanations of human behavior or whole aspects 
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of reality which are fundamentally mistaken due to the 
failure to grasp the nature of the material conditions 
underlying this thinking. Historically this arises 
from the cleavage between physical and mental labor, 
and the derogatory connotation of the term 'ideology1 
and 'false consciousness' seems to imply a stubborn 
refusal of such thinking to become scientific. This is 
not to say that such thinking is necessarily aware of 
itself as theoretically deficient, but only that it 
does serve the interest of a dominant class and is an 
expression of social alienation. Because of the self-
serving character of this form of thought it treates 
its theories as indubitably and eternally true, unlike 
science which treates its theories as provisional and 
always subject to further testing.[55] True conscious-
ness, on the other hand, involves an awareness of the 
connection between material conditions and concep-
tualization of ideas such that one is able to under-
stand the real workings of the social relations of 
one's own time and of the general character of the 
development of the process of history as a whole. The 
proletariat, or at least its intellectuals, are not 
tied conceptually to artificial class interests because 
as the universal class the proletariat represents for 
Marx the interests of man as a whole, i.e., liberation 
from material and social domination in order to satisfy 
human needs in a free and creative manner. 
Implicit in the above account is the distinction 
between ideology and science, and it does appear that 
Marx and Engels thought of their work as scientific and 
therefore immune to the sorts of objections which they 
raised against ideological thinking. However, it would 
be a mistake to think that they viewed their science as 
some sort of positivism which would completely relativ-
ize the truths of history. We have suggested above 
that Marx's method of treatment of production can be 
traced back to Hegelian origins, and we know that the 
Hegelian conception of science is rooted in the use of 
the orgainic model for explaining reality. V/hat ever 
decided differences result from Marx's 'inversion' of 
Hegel it is clear that Marx inherited from Hegel the 
assumption that history must be treated as a totality, 
that it has a hidden rationality which can be under-
stood and that philosophical thinking can provide norms 
for the critique of one-sided conceptions of reality. 
As George Lichtheim has put it: 
To Marx, as to any Hegelian, the actual world of 
empirical perception was only an imperfect 
realization—at times indeed a caricature--of the 
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real or rational world, in which man's essential 
nature (his rationality) will have overcome the 
reified existence he leads while the surrounding 
object-world is not perceived as the product of 
his own creativity. The attainment of this 
liberated state is the work of history, whose di-
alectic is not disclosed by empirical reflection, 
but by critical (philosophical) reflection upon 
the totality of the process.[56] 
I would contend that it is precisely this 'totalistic' 
side of Marx which provides the framework for under-
standing the consistency of his thinking about the role 
of consciousness in history. It is true that at times 
Marx tends to provide analyses which abstract away from 
the totality of relations with which he is concerned 
for the purpose of isolating certain elements for close 
examination, and when these abstractions are looked 
upon as constituting Marx's final word on the subject 
he indeed appears as a positivist or relativist. It is 
only .by keeping in mind the organic conception of 
reality which Marx utilises throughout his works that 
we can avoid this mistaken conclusion. 
Having said all of this, we must admit that ul-
timately Marx appears ambivalent concerning the role of 
consciousness in history in that he does not apply in a 
clear fashion his model of human activity to the 
relation of base and superstructure, especially with 
respect to the place of theoretical critique of social 
consciousness. This may v/ell be because as J. Habermas 
points out, "Marx reduces the process of reflection to 
the level of instrumental action. . . . Marx conceives 
of reflection according to the model of produc-
tion. "(57) As a result, Marx never quite gives up the 
classification of his science of man within the natural 
sciences, despite the fact that natural science lacks 
the element of reflection necessary for a humanistic 
critique of social reality.[58 ] Marx in defining 
labor as the synthesis of man and nature, as we saw in 
the discussion of the theses on Feuerbach, attempts to 
capture both the technical and practical dimensions of 
human existence, but whether the guiding concept of 
production can capture the dynamic of revolutionary or 
critical-practical activity is doubtful. Productive 
knowledge and critical-practical knowledge provide 
different frameworks of human activity, the first 
requiring a synthesis of man and nature through labor, 
the second a synthesis of man and man through class 
struggle.[59) Marx gave us at the core of his system a 
critique of political economy which would provide 
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knowledge of man's productivity but he did not provide 
a critique of ideology in order to clarify the exact 
relation between theory and revolutionary practice. 
Only something like the latter would have justified 
Marx's statement that "just as philosophy finds its 
material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat 
finds its intellectual weapons in philosophy."[60J 
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